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We humanize theory by fusing humanity’s need for common direc-
tion — theory — with story. (Maracle, “Oratory” 237)
The novel always includes in itself the activity of coming to know
another’s word, a coming to knowledge whose process is represented
in the novel. (Bakhtin, “Discourse” 353)
THE OBJECTIVE OF THIS PAPER is twofold: to examine cultural            dialogue in Lee Maracle’s Ravensong using Mikhail Bakhtin’s           theories of language and the novel, and to examine Bakhtinian
dialogism in light of Native literary theory as it is manifested in the novel
and in the works of other Aboriginal critics. I aim, in other words, not
only to examine dialogue, but to enact it. I undertake to do this mind-
ful of Kimberly Blaeser’s warning:
The insistence on reading Native literature by way of Western liter-
ary theory clearly violates its integrity and performs a new act of colo-
nization and conquest. … The literature is approached with an
already established theory, and the implication is that the worth of the
literature is essentially validated by its demonstrated adherence to a
respected literary mode, dynamic or style. (55-56)
By allowing non-Native literary theory and Native work to interro-
gate each other, I hope to avoid the recolonizing that Blaeser identifies
and to create a constructive, mutual interaction between them.
Bakhtinian theory, with its emphasis on dialogism, has been a particularly
productive tool for analyzing and understanding literatures that draw on
oral traditions. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to offer a sur-
vey of Bakhtin’s influence on modern literary and cultural criticism, his
ideas have played a role in many seminal studies, including Louis Owens’s
Other Destinies: Understanding the American Indian Novel, Henry Louis
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Gates, Jr.’s The Signifying Monkey: A Theory of African-American Literary
Criticism, and Ramón Saldívar’s Chicano Narrative: The Dialectics of
Difference. However, Craig S. Womack suggests that the indiscriminate
application of Bakhtin’s ideas has also been instrumental in creating a
generic category of “ethnic literature” that effaces or trivializes differences
between the literatures of different cultural communities, “reducing lit-
erary studies to little more than an English department version of the
melting pot” (8). Womack’s observations suggest that, unless Bakhtinian
theory is applied in a self-critical fashion — one that takes into account
the culturally-specific ways in which various literatures are produced and
received, as well as the potential effects of inequality between participants
in a dialogic interaction — it can elide social or cultural tensions both
within a work and between authors and readers. Part of the interest in ap-
plying Bakhtin to Maracle’s novel is that Ravensong both effects and inter-
rogates the idea of dialogue; the work accommodates and yet resists
Bakhtin’s ideas as it reveals the complex dynamics of dialogue when inter-
locutors are separated by a cultural, social, and economic divide.
Bakhtin identifies two types of dialogic relationships in language: “the
dialogic relationship toward an alien word within the object and the re-
lationship toward an alien word in the anticipated answer of the listener”
(“Discourse” 283). The relationship between words and things is dialogic
because any object is “already enveloped in an obscuring mist — or, on
the contrary, by the ‘light’ of alien words that have already been spoken
about it” (276). A word is like a ray of white light trained on an object,
but the words and discourse already surrounding the object effect a “spec-
tral dispersion” that fractures the unified ray; the ray-word, interacting
with the words that already envelop the object, becomes multi-hued, re-
flecting particular facets of the object in a contingent, dialogic manner
rather than fixing it in a monologic beam (277). The relationship between
speaker and listener (expressed most schematically in information theory
as a linear process of encoding, transmission, and decoding) is also
dialogic because “every word is directed toward an answer and cannot
escape the profound influence of the answering word that it anticipates”
(280). In dialogue, speaker and listener, encoding and decoding, interpen-
etrate each other: encoding contains traces of the anticipated decoding,
and decoding is performed in anticipation of encoding a response.
Whereas monological language is authoritative and non-relational,
dialogic language is “relativized, de-privileged, aware of competing defi-
nitions for the same things” (Emerson and Holquist 427). In place of a
communication model that is unidirectional or oscillatory, dialogue of-
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fers one that is iterative and cyclical.1 While the former sense of dialogue
between word and object accords with the observations of some Aborigi-
nal critics and writers (see Leslie Marmon Silko’s comment that “when
one is telling a story and one is using words to tell the story, each word
that one is speaking has a story of its own, too” [50]), it is the latter sense
of dialogue on which this paper focusses.
Bakhtin’s description of the dialogic relationship between speaker
and listener parallels many ideas about Aboriginal story and language that
are expressed in the work of Native critics. Silko states that among the
Pueblo people, “a great deal of the story is believed to be inside the lis-
teners; the storyteller’s role is to draw the story out of the listeners” (50).
A story is not a text transmitted by a speaker to an audience, but a web
spun by the storyteller that interweaves different threads — speaker, au-
dience, and cultural and narrative traditions — that exist within the sto-
rytelling context. Each thread contributes its own dynamic tension to the
web, and the resulting story is the dialogic sum of all the threads. In a
similar vein, Louis Owens suggests that in oral Aboriginal narrative “con-
text and text are one thing” (13) — the audience does not need to apply
an independent interpretive framework to a story because the story itself
is an instantiation of the cultural knowledge shared by both storyteller
and audience. As Paula Gunn Allen states, the unity of the oral tradition
lies not in formal structures but in “the coherence of common under-
standing derived from the ritual tradition that members of a tribal unit
share” (6). These critics all assert that a story is not a text that exists out-
side of a speaker and listener; rather, the story embodies or actuates the
relationship between the speaker, the listener, and their shared context.
These writers’ efforts to link story with a holistic context are similar to
Bakhtin’s efforts to define the basic unit of communication not as an
abstract structural unit removed from actual language use (phoneme,
word, sentence), but as the utterance, a statement whose completion is
marked by “the possibility of responding to it or, more precisely and
broadly, of assuming a responsive attitude toward it” (“Speech Genres”
76). An utterance can be composed of any variety or number of gram-
matical or syntactical units. It can be embodied as a statement, a question,
a speech, or a novel, although the particular way in which the elements
of a given utterance are arranged is almost always governed by generic
conventions that reflect the social sphere in which it exists, so that it is not
a completely free individual construction; the only common defining trait
of all utterances is the intention to evoke a response, however complex.
Because the listener’s response is central to the utterance’s nature, it
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is inherently dialogic rather than monologic, and this dialogism is reflected
not only in how the utterance functions in communication between speech
subjects, but in the very structure of the utterance itself. The utterance is
not an isolated statement (if it is treated as one, it becomes mere text), but
exists only relationally — it requires the entire communicative context in
order to function as an utterance because, in order to evoke its response, a
given utterance includes as an integral part of its makeup the other utter-
ances that preceded it and those that are anticipated to follow it: “Utter-
ances are not indifferent to one another, and are not self-sufficient; they are
aware of and mutually reflect one another. … Each utterance is filled with
echoes and reverberations of other utterances to which it is related by the
communality of the sphere of speech communication” (“Speech Genres”
91). This interconnectedness between utterances is reminiscent of Silko’s
statement that Pueblo stories as a whole form a kind of web, so that the
Aboriginal perspective on narrative is one of “story within story, the idea
that one story is only the beginning of many stories and the sense that sto-
ries never truly end” (50). Like Aboriginal narrative as described by Silko,
the utterance is not only a participant in an external dialogue, but is inter-
nally dialogic; it not only participates in a communicative process that in-
volves different voices, but itself contains different voices — it is doubly
heteroglot: “The authentic environment of an utterance, the environment
in which it lives and takes shape, is dialogized heteroglossia” (“Discourse”
272). In speaking an utterance, the speaker must in effect become the lis-
tener, responding to previous utterances and anticipating future ones. And,
in listening to an utterance, “Any understanding is imbued with response
and necessarily elicits it in one form or another: the listener becomes the
speaker” (“Speech Genres” 68), although the listener’s response may be
delayed rather than immediate, and may be one of disagreement rather than
agreement.
The concept of story as dialogic utterance seems consonant with Lee
Maracle’s assertion that, although the Aboriginal oral tradition contains
many of the same elements as the European storytelling tradition, “The
difference is that the reader is as much a part of the story as the teller. …
[T]he reader must remain central to the working out of the drama of life
represented. As listener/reader, you become the trickster, the architect of
great social transformation at whatever level you choose” (“Preface” 11, 13).
Maracle’s statement positions story as utterance, a response invoking a
response. But her statement is both an invitation and a warning. As Susie
O’Brien points out, “by inviting the reader to become Trickster, she
[Maracle] points to the necessary failure of all attempts to consolidate a
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comfortable theoretical position” (83), and this indeterminacy is also
integral to the utterance (particularly, as we shall see, as it occurs in the
novel), since the different voices external to and immanent in the utter-
ance engage in a complex process of mutual reflection. The voices do not
merely agree with or contradict each other; rather, each voice is presented
in terms of the other, and each voice qualifies the other:
Languages of heteroglossia, like mirrors that face each other, each
reflecting in its own way a piece, a tiny corner of the world, force us
to guess at and grasp for a world behind their mutually reflecting
aspects that is broader, more multi-leveled, containing more and
varied horizons than would be available to a single language or a sin-
gle mirror. (Bakhtin, “Discourse” 414-15)
This dialogic destabilization is more than an echo of the deconstructive mise
en abyme because the utterance is not isolated within language, as are the
signifier and its alienated signified. Instead, the utterance operates on the
social or cultural plane, and so the result is not a retreat into a disembod-
ied language, but a renewed transformation of speaker into listener, listener
into speaker as the sociocultural dialogue continues. There are two levels
on which Ravensong raises the question of how, in a colonial context, this
cultural dialogue is possible, or under what conditions it might occur:
within the story of the novel (in narrative terms, diegetically), as it depicts
the struggles of Stacey, a young Salish woman, to define her place within
her Native community and to understand the relationship between her
village and white town, the non-Native community across the river where
she goes to school; and outside the story of the novel (extradiegetically), in
the discursive strategies that are used to tell the story. This paper will there-
fore examine both how dialogic utterances function within the novel, and
how the novel itself functions as an utterance.
Gerald Vizenor writes, “The trickster is a comic discourse, a collec-
tion of ‘utterances’ in oral traditions; the opposite of a comic discourse
is a monologue, an utterance in isolation, which comes closer to the tragic
mode in literature and not a comic tribal world view” (“Holotrope” 191).
The isolated utterance is tragic because it is an evocation of response
which, removed from its communicative context, is reified as mere text.
Dialogism, Vizenor argues, is comic because it “summons agonistic im-
agination in a narrative, a language game” (188); dialogue frames utter-
ances in terms of each other, so that claims to absoluteness are qualified
and seem absurd. Vizenor, quoting Bakhtin, identifies social science in
particular as operating in the tragic mode:
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“Discourse lives, as it were, beyond itself, in a living impulse toward
the object,” which in this instance is the trickster; “if we detach our-
selves completely from this impulse,” as social science has done in the
translations of oral narratives and the comic trickster, “all we have left
is the naked corpse of the word, from which we can learn nothing at
all about the social situation or fate of a given word in life.” (191)
The anthropological gaze, because it studies utterances apart from their
contexts and refuses to enter into dialogue with those it observes (the
observer and the observed relate as subject and object, rather than as in-
terlocutors), paradoxically increases its distance from those it studies even
as it increases its knowledge of them.
In Ravensong, all the people of the village are isolated from the peo-
ple of white town, but Stacey, who has the benefit of her education, is
isolated in a different way. Speaking about German Judy, a non-Native
lesbian living in the village with her Salish partner, Rena, Stacey’s
mother says, “She’s white and so she don’t count” (123), and later she
categorically dismisses all the people of white town, stating, “They
aren’t human” (193). Stacey is forced to ponder the validity of those
profoundly monologic statements, and finds that her thoughts are in-
habited by conflicting, dialogic voices that qualify each other: “What
did she mean by the white one does not count? How could Stacey know
that the white one did not count? How could she not know? came back
at her. It was not an answer she could accept” (127). Although Stacey
cannot completely accept this summary dismissal of the people in white
town, she engages in a different mode of distancing that reflects the
anthropological gaze characteristic of non-Native society back on itself.
When Carol Snowden, Stacey’s only non-Native friend, loses her grand-
mother, Stacey removes herself from Carol’s loss and begins a process
of objectifying analysis: “They didn’t grieve in quite the same way. The
funeral she had attended was that of her only school chum’s grand-
mother. Carol cried. She cried plain and simple, without much depth,
no horror” (15). When she visits Carol’s home, she analyses Mrs.
Snowden’s greeting, a simple “Hi girls”: “For some reason Stacey could
not help consigning these people’s behaviour into some weird purgatory
of helpless callousness. She read sinister motives into their every ordi-
nary movement lately. This greeting seemed both false and fitting, al-
most characteristic of their world” (33). Stacey’s mode of anthro-
pological analysis is a product of her exposure to the culture and lan-
guage of white town. Within the context of her own culture, it would
be impossible to even conceive of the differences between the two com-
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munities in the way that she does: “She let her mind drift around the
habits of white town, their strange customs. It made better sense in
English than in her own language. The lack of connectedness between
white folks was difficult to express in her language” (17).
This reversal of the objectifying gaze removes non-Native readers
from their accustomed hegemonic position, placing Native conscious-
ness at the centre of the novel, with non-Native characters and readers
at the margins. The question of whether white people count is trans-
posed from the level of the story to the level of the narration. Non-
Native readers are citizens of white town, and they are prompted to
consider the same question: do we count as addressees for this story? As
Helen Hoy observes,
Giving whites the accent, so to speak, the dialect, against the norm of
Native speech, giving whites a non-transparent culture, is itself
transformative, a political act. It repositions both white and Native
reader, so that, within the discursive framework of Ravensong at least,
the Native reader is the one with full citizenship, an epistemological
shift with the potential to produce material sociopolitical change. (135)
Bakhtin writes, “every literary work faces outward away from itself, toward
the listener-reader, and to a certain extent thus anticipates possible reac-
tions to itself” (“Chronotope” 257), but in Ravensong non-Native read-
ers see the narrator only in profile, speaking to someone else.
However, the counter-hegemonic narrative structure is more than just
a reversal of positions; it also serves to incite a dynamic dialogue. Bakhtin
suggests that a character’s language in the novel is always an image of a lan-
guage. That is, a character’s language, set within the heteroglot world of the
novel, becomes alienated from itself, qualified, self-critical: “The author
represents this language, carries on a conversation with it, and the conver-
sation penetrates into the interior of this language-image and dialogizes it
from within. And all essentially novelistic images share this quality: they are
internally dialogized images — of the languages, styles, world views of an-
other” (“Prehistory” 46). On the diegetic level, Stacey’s adoption of the
anthropological gaze is monologic and isolating, but on the extradiegetic
level, it is profoundly dialogic, especially for non-Native readers. In Stacey’s
comments non-Native readers hear the objectifying language of white town
— the colonizing society’s way of framing the alien Native Other — ap-
plied to white town itself, of which they are implicitly citizens. Non-
Native readers are in turn moved to engage in a dialogue with their own
language, to question not only the validity of Stacey’s conclusions but the
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validity of her approach, so the objectivity that is asserted by the anthro-
pological gaze and the security of their own hegemonic status outside the
world of the novel are undermined. The novel is an utterance to non-
Native readers that includes their own hegemonic words, and non-Na-
tive readers, in their response to the novel, also include their own words,
but differently framed (they refuse Stacey’s words, which are also their
words). But this dialogue does not neutralize the diegetic monologism of
Stacey’s statements — instead, it only complexifies it. Non-Native readers
may want assurances from within the novel that Stacey’s pronouncements
are “wrong,” and that the refusal to accept her words is “right,” but the
interplay and mutual reflection of the many voices in the novel, all of
which are from an Aboriginal perspective, give no such easy guidance.
The refusal is in turn echoed by the novel, but framed within the context
of the many other voices that exist within it; in Bakhtin’s terms, “The
language of the novel is a system of languages that mutually and ideologi-
cally interanimate each other. It is impossible to describe and analyze it
as a single unitary language” (“Prehistory” 47). Stacey’s language (which,
in its anthropologizing, is also the non-Native reader’s) is qualified, but,
as we shall see, so is any other language, such as Raven’s, that would re-
fute it. As Trickster-readers, we are forced to continue this dialogic play,
this process of mutual reflection, without the benefit of a transcendent
language that would seal the last utterance. We are not allowed to escape
from our role as creators of the story.
Nor does Maracle’s novel allow Native readers to easily occupy a
hegemonic position by identifying with Stacey. Stacey’s objectifying
words, after all, are those of non-Native society, and the congruence of
Stacey’s way of seeing and that of non-Native society is further manifested
when Stacey turns her gaze on Madeline, a Saulteaux woman who is not
originally from the village. Stacey distances Madeline in the same way that
she does the citizens of white town, calling her a “nameless woman with-
out family, without beginning or end” (157), an isolated figure who is an
Other: “While the woman was not one of them, the children were” (159).
But at the same time, Stacey is aligned with white town in how she con-
structs Madeline, framing her in terms of romantic, idealistic images of
Aboriginals: “Stacey realized one morning over tea that Madeline looked
like the Indian she had once seen on a postcard in the store in town. …
It dawned on her that Madeline’s people must be the ones white people
kept calling ‘exotic’” (166). Stacey also views Madeline as an exotic speci-
men, “watching Madeline, turning over and over in her mind how she was
different,” and dwells on Madeline’s sensuality, her “wild abandon and ill-
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discipline” (173). Stacey only comes to a partial realization of the
objectifying nature of her gaze after she carelessly interrogates Madeline,
asking her about her abusive husband: “So how come you bothered with
the old snake?” (166). The pain this question causes Madeline makes Stacey
realize that her question was not an invitation to dialogue, not a true utter-
ance, because it did not actually include in it Madeline’s function as re-
spondent: “Words are sacred, once spoken they cannot be retrieved.
Sometimes they fall out of the mouth in moments of thoughtlessness when
the speaker focuses on images which don’t include the one spoken to, and
burn holes in the lives of the listener” (167). Stacey’s monologic question
arises from her objectification of Madeline, but a “dark patch” stops her
from exploring the meaning of her question. Stacey’s appropriation of the
anthropological gaze from white town and her use of it on Madeline are in
fact forms of self-alienation. They lead her to experience her own
aboriginality as an outsider would, and as a result, she becomes for a time
isolated not only from white town but also from her own family and com-
munity; Celia notices that “a wall of soundlessness cocooned her sister,
making the distance between them huge” (168).
Stacey’s treatment of Madeline and the consequences that arise
from it show that the appropriation of others’ words is a potentially
dangerous activity. Stacey, who is leaving the village for university in
order to “collect the magic words of white town and bring them home”
(192), has to discover how she will frame those words in her own speech
so that they will become tools of cultural regeneration rather than tools
of assimilation. But in the act of doing so, she will inevitably enter into
a dialogue with those that the village monologically labels as Others,
since the “magic words” do not exist in a neutral place that can be
accessed without sacrificing isolation; rather, they must be snatched
from the mouths of others through ideological struggle. Speaking of N.
Scott Momaday, Owens writes, “the task before him was not simply to
learn the lost language of his tribe but rather to appropriate, to tear free
of its restricting authority, another language — English — and to make
that language accessible to an Indian discourse” (13). This act of appro-
priation is, for Bakhtin, one of the central features of ideological devel-
opment:
Language, for the individual consciousness, lies on the borderline
between oneself and the other. The word in language is half someone
else’s. It becomes “one’s own” only when the speaker populates it
with his own intention, his own accent, when he appropriates the
word, adapting it to his own semantic and expressive intention. Prior
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to this moment of appropriation, the word does not exist in a neu-
tral and impersonal language (it is not, after all, out of a dictionary
that the speaker gets his words!), but rather it exists in other people’s
mouths, in other people’s contexts, serving other people’s intentions:
it is from there that one must take the word, and make it one’s own.
… Language is not a neutral medium that passes freely and easily into
the private property of the speaker’s intentions; it is populated —
overpopulated — with the intentions of others. Expropriating it, forc-
ing it to submit to one’s own intentions and accents, is a difficult and
complicated process. (“Discourse” 293-94)
Emma LaRocque points out the problematic relationship of Abo-
riginal people to non-Aboriginal languages, and particularly writing,
when she states, “Native writers have a dialectical relationship to the
English (or French) language. Not only do we have to learn English, we
must then deal with its ideology. … What is at work is the power strug-
gle between the oral and the written, between the Native in us and the
English” (xx). But Stacey’s potential to appropriate successfully the Eng-
lish language for her community is shown in how she teaches the alpha-
bet, framing the very medium of isolated text in a dialogic manner: “She
concocted a story about a family namd [sic] Alphabet, gave them names
and work to do. She even threw in trickster behaviour for those moments
when none of the Alphabets would do the right work” (175). Stacey’s
teaching places the English language and written text within the frame-
work of a distinctly Aboriginal utterance, and the ability of the women
to read in English while still maintaining their own cultural perspective
is shown when they read about the wars of the Chinese dynasties: “They
laughed at some of the attitudes it took to go to war in the first place,
marvelling at the lack of heart of whoever had written this stuff who
heroized the killers” (177). Momma and Madeline have a critical aware-
ness not only of the content of their text but of the discourse used to
communicate it; they demonstrate that it is possible to use the colonizer’s
language without being colonized. Reading also teaches Momma that
words are not a neutral medium, that their meaning depends on social
context. When Stacey says that children don’t read complex stories be-
cause “they don’t know as many words and the words they know don’t
hold the same meaning,” Momma changes the context of difference from
one of age to one of social status and culture: “I guess not. The ’flu means
illness to them. For us it means terror” (178). Their realization of this
potential gap in meaning reinforces for them the importance of not tak-
ing the words as they find them, but of making them their own: “Con-
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sciousness finds itself inevitably facing the necessity of having to choose a
language. With each literary-verbal performance, consciousness must ac-
tively orient itself amidst heteroglossia, it must move in and occupy a
position for itself within it” (Bakhtin, “Discourse” 295).
But if one only uses language as it exists in the mouths of others,
there is no ideological awareness, only an unthinking conformity that
supports a hegemonic view of the world — an option congenial to those
who already belong to the dominant group. Steve is the class intellectual,
but he cannot engage in genuine dialogue with Stacey because he is un-
able to incorporate her separate reality into his utterances; Stacey asks,
“Where do you begin telling someone their world is not the only one?”
(72). When Steve and Stacey first meet, he “casually fell in beside her, as
though to walk her home — much to Stacey’s annoyance. Since he hadn’t
asked to join her, there was nothing to say no to. What sort of authority
is that, she wondered?” (72). Steve’s authority, like white town’s, comes
from the assumption that silence equals assent to a particular social or
political arrangement, that the non-Native paradigm is the default from
which any departure must be marked. Hegemony hangs on a presumed
meaning for any word or silence, and where there is no knowledge or ac-
knowledgement of difference, there can be no dialogue, only a monologic
assumption of power — monologic in its lack of concern with the Oth-
er’s response, and monologic in its assumption of and reinforcement of
a unified language. Although Stacey’s own thought is intensely heteroglot,
comprising Steve’s voice, her own, and a third voice that frames them in
terms of each other, Steve’s assumption of power means that she cannot
form an utterance that would enable her to express her disinterest in him.
His initial silence has in turn silenced her:
A crazy argument began inside. She wanted to laugh at herself. She
could just tell him, “Look, I am not interested.” White boys always
have a response which is designed to save their pride by assaulting
yours. Something like “Who said I was interested?” would likely fall
from his mouth, bringing up shame to hers. She could hear him say
that he just wanted to talk. She would then feel ashamed of misread-
ing his intentions. (74)
Only the outsider is aware of the need for dialogue; the insider re-
mains unconscious of the Other. As Maracle points out, “The people at
the bottom see more clearly what’s happening than the people at the top
seeing down” (“Conversation” 83). Stacey wonders, “Is it prejudice or a
gulf of difference too deep to cross? Steve was self-absorbed. He had no
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idea of the gulf between them or the end of the road for her should their
relationship fail” (90). The final conversation between Stacey and Steve
begins with the idea of economic appropriation but soon moves into
questions of cultural hegemony. Steve explains how the folding chairs he
brought for Ella were invented in Indonesia but subsequently patented
and sold by white men, and he launches into a discussion about “other
ideas someone had scooped and patented and gotten rich from” (184).
For Steve, who is part of the dominant culture, the chair is simply an
example of how the economic system works, but for Stacey, it is a prod-
uct of colonialism: “Stacey wondered how they managed to shamelessly
steal the thinking of so many different people whom they called inferior”
(184). When she mentions this to Steve, it once more becomes apparent
to her that although Steve possesses a vocabulary that implies awareness,
he is not ideologically aware — his approval of economic appropriation
betrays an unquestioning acceptance of the word as it is spoken by his cul-
ture and an unwillingness to imagine what other meanings are possible:
“I don’t know,” he answered, curious. “I never thought about it be-
fore.” This surprised Stacey. It made her wonder what else he did not
have to think about. How much of the information he owned in-
spired thoughts in him, how much just gets filed in his mind with-
out him ever thinking about it again? (184)
Steve’s inability to move outside of his own perspective is further illus-
trated in his questioning of why Stacey does not accept his advances. He
asks, “Is it because I am white?” — a question that focusses attention on
his status rather than Stacey’s — and Stacey replies, “No … it’s because
you aren’t Indian” (185), in a vain attempt to shift his awareness to her.
Stacey ultimately believes that Steve is not going to choose the meanings
of his own words, that he will continue to use words as they exist in the
mouths of the others in his culture: “Steve’s future was pre-cut from some
cloth she did not want to wear” (188).
But, although Stacey does not in the end accept Steve, she may have
sown in him the seed of a potential future dialogue between the village
and white town. Stacey states that she and Steve have no context for a
relationship: “until you have experienced the horror of an epidemic, a fire,
drought and the absolute threat these things pose to the whole village’s
survival — and care about it, care desperately — you will be without a
relevant context.” Steve replies, “I can’t conjure that up in my side of town”
(186). His use of the word “conjure” implies that all the events Stacey has
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described are caused ahistorically, as if by a kind of sorcery. But Stacey
introduces the historical through the personal:
“How did it feel to watch us die, Steve?” she asked. It was mean. She
didn’t care much that it was mean. Steve blushed. His father was one
of the white doctors who could not possibly be expected to cross the
river to treat “those” people. … “Shame, Steve. You are now feeling
shame,” she said without any emotion whatsoever. (186)
Stacey’s remark implicates Steve in the events that he had imagined were
conjured; it identifies him as a part of the village’s context, but as a part
that is responsible only for death. It also removes him from the safety
of his liberalism, the easy assumption that he is like all people and that
all people are like him, and places him in the sphere of group politics
where, in order to negotiate multiple languages and realities, he will
have to engage in a genuine dialogue that qualifies his own hegemonic
language.
Stacey and Steve evoke reciprocal feelings in each other that are rep-
resentative of their disparate cultures: Stacey evokes shame in Steve, and
Steve, in turn, evokes guilt in Stacey. Bakhtin distinguishes between two
types of discourse that are present when the assimilation of another’s
words is not only for “information, directions, rules, models and so forth
— but strives rather to determine the very bases of our ideological inter-
relations with the world, the very basis of our behaviour” (“Discourse”
342): internally persuasive discourse and authoritative discourse. Al-
though Steve does not respond verbally to Stacey, his feeling of shame
shows that he has finally engaged dialogically with her. Stacey does not
have the social or cultural authority to assign guilt to Steve but, to the
extent that he has engaged in a dialogical relation with her, Steve is un-
able to avoid constructing himself at least partly through her language.
His shame constitutes a response to her utterance that is potentially pro-
ductive because it is internally persuasive:
Internally persuasive discourse — as opposed to one that is externally
authoritative — is, as it is affirmed through assimilation, tightly inter-
woven with “one’s own word.” In the everyday rounds of our con-
sciousness, the internally persuasive word is half-ours and half-someone
else’s. Its creativity and productiveness consist precisely in the fact that
such a word awakens new and independent words, that it organizes
masses of our words from within, and does not remain in an isolated
and static condition. … The semantic structure of an internally persua
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sive discourse is not finite, it is open; in each of the new contexts that
dialogize it, this discourse is able to reveal ever newer ways to mean.
(Bakhtin, “Discourse” 345-46)
Steve’s shame, because it is dialogically developed and resolved (it is a
word half-his and half-Stacey’s), is dynamic rather than static, potentially
promoting new ways of speaking and acting.2 But Steve’s reaction to his
shame provokes in Stacey a feeling of guilt, a method of control which
is monologic and characteristic of his culture. In contrast to shame, which
can be internally persuasive, guilt is an exclusively authoritative discourse:
The authoritative word demands that we acknowledge it, that we
make it our own; it binds us, quite independent of any power it might
have to persuade us internally; we encounter it with its authority al-
ready fused to it. … It is not a free appropriation and assimilation of
the word itself that authoritative discourse seeks to elicit from us;
rather, it demands our unconditional allegiance. Therefore authori-
tative discourse permits no play with the context framing it, no play
with its borders. … It enters our verbal consciousness as a compact
and indivisible mass; one must either totally affirm it, or totally re-
ject it. It is indissolubly fused with its authority — with political
power, an institution, a person — and it stands and falls together with
that authority. (Bakhtin, “Discourse” 342-43)
Therefore, in order to reject the guilt that Steve imposes on her, Stacey
must also reject Steve:
Steve’s bent shoulders culled a twinge of guilt inside Stacey. She tried
to shake it off. The gulf between them widened. It grew until it be-
came an ugly maw. A maw filled with a powerful raging wind that
whirled everything into its centre. Stacey hung fast to the fragile
thread of herself. This maw could swallow her, given the opportunity.
She resisted the pull of the wind. (186-87)
Steve’s counter-utterance of guilt stands in contrast to that of the Snake,
who felt deep shame when he was banished for abusing Madeline and his
daughters but left the village with dignity “to assure the people he had no
quarrel with their decision. He had not wished to add the coercive force
of guilt on top of his crime against womanhood onto the shoulders of the
community” (186). While Steve’s reaction prevents him from engaging
in further conversation with Stacey, his shame decentres the hegemonic
voice of his own culture, leaving him with the potential to engage in dia-
logues with other languages and other voices.
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If Steve serves initially to show Stacey the hegemony and monologism
of white town, then Polly challenges Stacey’s own desire for cultural iso-
lation, which is also a form of monologism. When Herb’s sexually explicit
note to Polly is read out in class and the students laugh (a devastating
example of how the meaning of an utterance is dependent on speaker and
audience, rather than being fixed in the text), Stacey immediately feels an
identification with Polly: “Stacey cringed at the laughter. Every time she
heard someone being laughed at, the derisive laughter aimed at her dur-
ing her school years revisited her” (28). Stacey knows that she and Polly
are both marginalized, but this shared status complicates her simple im-
age of two distinct communities — village and white town — and so she
tries to negate her feelings: “Polly is one of theirs, she told herself: ‘Noth-
ing to do with me’” (29).
Although she despises white town for its monologism, Stacey also
bases her identity on a concept of cultural purity, and therefore on a
purity of language (not national language, but language in the
Bakhtinian sense, as a marker of social grouping or stratification). She
does not want cultural boundaries blurred by the application of other
boundaries which may cross cultural lines, since as soon as she starts
complexifying the situation all the different ways of positioning herself
will begin to qualify one another, and all the different languages asso-
ciated with those different ways of positioning will begin to comment
on one another. The risk of acknowledging polyglossia is that inevita-
bly one’s own language is decentred (“in place of a single, unitary
sealed-off Ptolemaic world of language, there appeared the open
Galilean world of many languages, mutually animating each other”
[Bakhtin, “Prehistory” 65]), and so Stacey tries to protect her bound-
ary and her monologism: “In the dark her analytic thoughts unfolded
in shallow logic. Stacey took care to leave her heart out of her final ex-
amination of Polly’s death. Polly had perished under the dome of ar-
rogant insecurity her people had erected for her” (63-64). But each time
she arrives at the bridge that leads from white town to her village, the
place where the two cultures can potentially cross over and meet each
other, the polyglossia Stacey so desperately wants to repress comes out:
Killed herself over lust. Stacey leaned against the fence in the middle
of the bridge, grappling with her insides, trying hard to root herself
to the water’s playful voice. […] Killed herself over lust … splash,
whish … killed … She fought to amplify the articulation of river’s
rush to sea in order to deaden the script set off inside by Polly’s pass-
ing. Killed herself over lust. Splash … killed herself over … whish …
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killed herself. Water crashed against stone, ripping it from the em-
bankment, growing louder until finally the internal quarrel was re-
duced to a repetitious whisper. She forced the last utterance from her
mind. Finally the voice tormenting her fell flat and the river’s chat-
ter came up, filtered through what seemed to be a long tunnel. […]
Stacey told herself that she couldn’t afford to get this whacked-out
over some white girl. (40)
Stacey washes away the second voice that calls her to identify with Polly
— she refuses to engage in a dialogue with it.
Although Stacey tries to suppress it, the image of Polly returns, es-
pecially when Stacey is near to the bridge, and often in association with
other members of the village — with Momma, who like Polly is a sexual
being (106); with Nora, for reasons Stacey cannot understand but which
may relate to Nora’s alienated status in the village (127); and with Stacey
herself, when she is relieved to find out that not many people know Ned
is her true father: “She blushed at her relief: getting caught was worse than
the act itself, ran through her mind. She felt like Polly” (102). These
pairings, rising unbidden in Stacey’s mind, might have suggested to her
that the membrane she has created between white town and the village is
more porous than she imagines, that Polly’s voice has a place among the
voices of the villagers. But Stacey’s final pairing of Polly is with Steve as
he crosses the bridge back to white town: “His back reminded her of
Polly. It no longer mattered why she killed herself” (188). Because the
novel ends with Stacey’s alienation from Carol, Steve, and Polly — all the
people who were significant to her in white town — the reader might
conclude that the final position of the novel on the possibility of cross-
cultural dialogue echoes Stacey’s. But there is one other voice in this poly-
glot novel that qualifies Stacey’s own utterances: Raven.
Raven is a character who advocates and embodies dialogue. Her song
in the opening passage of the novel is an utterance that contains within
itself echoes of the earth and is repeated and amplified by other natural
entities: “The song echoed the rolling motion of earth’s centre, filtering
itself through the last layer to reach outward to earth’s shoreline above the
deep. Wind changed direction, blowing the song toward cedar. Cedar
picked up the tune, repeated the refrain, each lacey branch bending to
echo ravensong” (9). Ravensong is a response that evokes response, and
the interweaving of different elements within nature into a unified whole
is a dialogic process that needs to be mimicked by the people who live on
the land if they are also to live in a way that is aligned with nature.
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Jeannette Armstrong writes that, in the Okanagan tradition, “language
was given to us by the land we live within” (175), and emphasizes that the
incorporation of the land-language into her own utterances is dialogic:
“Through my language I understand I am being spoken to, I’m not the
one speaking. The words are coming from many tongues and mouths of
Okanagan people and the land around them. I am a listener to the lan-
guage’s stories, and when my words form I am merely retelling the same
stories in different patterns” (181). From Raven’s perspective, the lack of
dialogue between the villagers and the citizens of white town (not only
in the sense of communication, but in the sense of mutually qualified
cultural perception) endangers the earth itself, and the repeated epidemics
the village suffers are her way of driving the villagers to white town and
of birthing shame in non-Natives so that they will learn from the villag-
ers how to live in a less destructive manner: “Both the earth and Raven
knew all the people belonged to them. Raven could never again be under-
stood outside the context of the others” (191). The villagers can no longer
understand Raven monologically, in an isolated manner; they must en-
ter the context of the others in order to understand her, so that an under-
standing of her is now implicitly dialogic. Each culture must see itself in
terms of the other:
In the realm of culture, outsideness is a most powerful factor in
understanding. It is only in the eyes of another culture that foreign
culture reveals itself fully and profoundly (but not maximally fully,
because there will be cultures that see and understand even more). A
meaning only reveals its depths once it has encountered and come
into contact with another, foreign meaning: they engage in a kind of
dialogue, which surmounts the closedness and one-sidedness of these
particular meanings, these cultures. … Such a dialogic encounter of
two cultures does not result in merging or mixing. Each retains its
own unity and open totality, but they are mutually enriched.
(Bakhtin, “Response” 7)
Raven always seeks to undermine monologism by adding another
qualifying voice, whether it is by directly projecting her voice into a char-
acter, as when she encourages Stacey’s identification with Polly: “Wan-
der around Polly’s insides, feel your way through decades, generations of
lostness. … Discover her spirit, bent, then broken. Re-invent Polly, re-
imagine her” (39), or by offering commentary on a character, as when she
qualifies Momma’s resentment of the Depression-era transients that
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stopped by the village for food: “You could have taken the time to teach
these men when first I brought them here. You stood silent. Why would
they return without reason?” (54). The non-Native reader is constantly
distanced in Ravensong by the exclusively Aboriginal point of view, but
Raven also qualifies the statements of Stacey and Momma, so all perspec-
tives within the novel are to some degree decentred. The novel offers
images of many languages, but we lay claim to our own language only to
find that we are estranged from it; we are continually invited into the
novel and yet denied a position as the internal reader so that we are forced
to engage dialogically with the other languages in the work: “what Raven
does when she sings is tell us that it’s time, that the time is coming and
to listen to what’s going on in a whole bunch of different ways” (Maracle,
“Conversation” 86).
Brill de Ramírez suggests that, “In choosing Ravensong as the title of
the novel, Maracle underscores the crucial importance of human interre-
latedness with all of creation. This interrelatedness is specifically manifested
in the person of Raven” (176). But even Raven does not possess the mas-
ter voice within the novel. Her voice qualifies others, but is also denied
absolute authority. Raven is, after all, a trickster, and as Vizenor states,
tricksters are not moral or functional. Tricksters are not artifacts.
Tricksters never prove culture or the absence of culture. Tricksters do
not prove the values that we live by, nor do they prove or demonstrate
the responses to domination by colonial democracies. … Tricksters
only exist in a comic sense between two people who take pleasure in
a language game and imagination, a noetic liberation of the mind.
(“Comic and Tragic” 70)
So the Trickster, even when she has the best intentions, is not a reliable,
stable figure. Maracle points out that “Raven becomes the trickster who
tries a plan that isn’t necessarily a pleasant plan, it doesn’t necessarily
work, but that’s the nature of Raven. It doesn’t necessarily transform
things in a good way, but Raven is the transformer, or the harbinger of
transformation, I should say, in our culture” (“Conversation” 74). In
fact, it is often when the Trickster has the best intentions that she over-
reaches and unintentionally includes herself in the destabilization she
effects. At one point Stacey even identifies her tendency to judge white
town with Raven: “She told herself to watch her own arrogance — it
was the mother of Raven’s folly, this arrogance” (131), and throughout
the novel, an unwillingness to defer to authority is attributed to having
“too much Raven,” with results that may be positive, as when Momma
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refuses to accept the degradations of residential school (107), negative,
as when Stacey breaks a taboo on having an unchaperoned visit with
Rena (125), or indeterminate, as when Stacey dismisses Steve (187).
Raven submits the villagers to plague after plague, but her confidence
in her plan seems to stem more from stubbornness than from transcend-
ent knowledge. At the beginning of the novel “Raven was convinced
that this catastrophe she planned to execute would finally wake the
people up, drive them to white town to fix the mess over there. Cedar
disagreed but had offered no alternative” (14). In the end, Cedar, whose
serene voice almost always qualifies Raven’s, is actually right — the
villagers remain aloof from white town, and even Stacey rejects Steve
and Polly.
Perhaps, as Raven confidently asserts, “It was not until this last ’flu
epidemic that finally the seeds of shame were sewn [sic]” (191) through
Stacey’s interaction with Steve, and perhaps the following epidemic of
cultural loss will finally induce the villagers to work to effect change in
non-Native culture, but the epilogue of the novel is ambiguous toward
and perhaps even contradictory to Raven’s assertions. It is an account of
Aboriginal cultural disintegration with no corresponding tale of a new
non-Native awareness. The suicide of Celia’s son echoes Polly’s suicide,
but that only links the two communities in tragedy rather than redemp-
tion. Stacey goes away to school to collect the words of white town, but
when she returns, the village is not allowed to build a school, and nobody
in white town will hire her. The ambiguous ending of the novel means
that all voices, even Raven’s, must engage in the heteroglot dialogue of the
novel. It also means that the reader too is prevented from regarding the
novel as a closed text that ultimately supports one voice or another, and
must engage dialogically with it:
The development of the novel is a function of the deepening of
dialogic essence, its increased scope and greater precision. Fewer and
fewer neutral, hard elements (“rock bottom truths”) remain that are
not drawn into the dialogue. Dialogue moves into the deepest mo-
lecular and, ultimately, subatomic levels. (Bakhtin, “Discourse” 300)
Bakhtin’s dialogic theory echoes Maracle’s remarks about the relationship
between reader and story in aboriginal storytelling:
Most of our stories don’t have orthodox “conclusions”; that is left to
the listeners, who we trust will draw useful lessons from the story —
not necessarily the lessons we wish them to draw, but all conclusions
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are considered valid. The listeners are drawn into the dilemma and
are expected at some point in their lives to actively work themselves
out of it. (“Preface” 11-12)
Maracle’s epilogue abruptly shifts the interpretive and diegetic
context of the entire novel, recasting the story as Stacey’s effort to ex-
plain to her son, Jacob, why his cousin committed suicide. The novel
is shifted from the written to the oral mode, and we, as readers, are
suddenly aware that we have unwittingly been part of an audience that
includes the other characters of the novel, that we are members of a
community that transcends diegetic levels. Stacey’s story leads Jacob to
ask a question: “Why did anyone pay attention to them [white
town]?”(198). The question reflects a closed reading of Stacey’s story,
a reading that we might share; it implies that nothing in the present
disposition of white town could justify the catastrophes visited upon the
village and that Raven’s plan is ultimately bankrupt. The grief into
which the women are plunged indicates the power of that reading —
“horrified by [the question’s] innocent simplicity,” the full toll of the
epidemics suddenly weighs down on them, and only the singing of
“their ancient grieving song” can relieve their anguish (198). But Stacey
had told her story “to recapture the lost sense of community that lay
wounded in the shape of Jimmy’s suicide” (197), and when Rena ech-
oes Jacob’s question, Stacey, laughing, offers an oblique answer that
suddenly opens up the story for Jacob, and for the readers of the novel:
“Not enough Raven” (198). Given Raven’s ambiguous status in the
novel as both saviour of the Earth and a sender of plagues, Stacey’s re-
sponse is both affirmative and ironic, shifting the tone from the tragic
to the comic (here we might recall Vizenor’s remark about the open,
comic nature of the utterance and the tragic nature of the monologic,
isolated text); it spurs Jacob and the reader to realize that the tragic
reading is incomplete, that the story is not a closed text describing the
past but a response to a question which requires us to respond in turn,
linking past with present. As in all dialogue, it is the unresolved
heteroglossia of Maracle’s novel that makes it an utterance to which the
reader must in turn respond. Like Stacey’s son Jacob, for whom the
story is told, we are led to realize that, although the novel has ended,
“the story was not over” (199).3
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NOTES
1 Susan Berry Brill de Ramírez, in her work Contemporary American Indian Literatures
and the Oral Tradition, offers this critique of Bakhtinian dialogism:
[E]ven the greater inclusivity of diverse voices within a Bakhtinian inter-
pretive framework is, nevertheless, based upon the oppositional linearity in-
herent to discursive structures. … [A] heteroglossia in which distinct voices
assert their own subjectivities and presences alternately through dialogue
is a substantially different reality than the conversive interweaving of voices
and persons that co-create and transform their own stories and each other
through their relational storytelling communication. (73)
Brill de Ramírez proposes that a conversive model emphasizing “relationality and
connectedness” between author and reader, or author and scholar, is more representational
of Aboriginal literature than dialogism, in particular because conversivity maintains the re-
lational nature of story, while dialogic methods tend to reduce the story to text (6). This paper
posits that Bakhtinian dialogism may be functionally closer to conversivity than Brill de
Ramírez suggests, at least in terms of its contextualizing of narrative and the interpenetration
of languages. As Bakhtin states, “There takes place within the novel an ideological transla-
tion of another’s language, and an overcoming of its otherness — an otherness that is only
contingent, external, illusory” (“Discourse” 365). However, Brill de Ramírez’s work does
suggest an essential difference between conversivity and dialogism — conversivity has an
inherent moral dimension that dialogism lacks:
Within a conversively informed worldview, all elements of creation are
recognized as fellow persons who function in the world (and in stories)
through their relationships to each other. Everything is perceived as pos-
sessing its own intentionality and manifesting its own subjectivity and
personhood after its own fashion and capacity. … [E]verything in creation
is understood to have its own responsibilities in and of itself and in relation
to the rest of creation. (115)
Although dialogism may not be, as Brill de Ramírez asserts, necessarily oppositional,
it can, unlike conversivity, be manifested through logomachy as well as through more coop-
erative forms of linguistic interaction. And, whereas conversivity is informed by an ethics,
epistemology, and ontology that Brill de Ramírez proposes is especially characteristic of
Aboriginal cultures, dialogue is primarily, as Emerson and Holquist suggest, a set of verbal
processes whose end result is a general relativization of words, languages, and cultures (427).
Conversivity stems from and works toward a particular vision of the world, but dialogue
destabilizes and deprivileges the language of all participants.
2 This is not to say that shame is always exclusively a matter of internal persuasion rather
than authoritative discourse, although it is so in Steve’s case. Bakhtin writes, “Both the au-
thority of discourse and its internal persuasiveness may be united in a single word — one
that is simultaneously authoritative and internally persuasive — despite the profound differ-
ences between these two categories of alien discourse” (“Discourse” 342). Shame, as opposed
to guilt, is inherently dialogic; it always involves an element of internal persuasion even if the
dialogized word is originally alien and authoritative. As Dee Horne points out, colonized
populations feel shame when they internalize the perceptions the colonizing culture has of
them — when the authoritative word of the Other becomes their own. Horne quotes Jean-
Paul Sartre’s comment on shame: “Shame is by nature recognition. I recognize that I am as
the Other sees me. … Thus shame is shame of oneself before the Other” (113).
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I suggest in my first note that dialogue, unlike conversivity, is not necessarily moral,
and therefore it is not without its risks in situations where a significant power imbalance exists
between interlocutors. One possible reading of Maracle’s novel which is qualified, though not
absolutely denied, by the epilogue is that Raven, in compelling the village to dialogue with
white town, is blind to the different effects of dialogic relativism on oppressed and dominant
populations. She dashes the villagers against the stony indifference of white town, but each
time white town remains unmoved and the villagers are scattered, struggling to retain their
sense of identity and community. Because of the power imbalance, Raven’s drive to dialogue
eventually leads to a situation where the authoritative word of white town becomes internally
persuasive for at least some of the villagers, such as Celia’s son, who commits suicide. At the
end of Ravensong, as Stacey is saying her goodbyes to the people in her village, she once more
contemplates Momma’s remark that white people don’t count, and Nora appears in her
imagination, saying, “Momma is neither wrong nor right. Of course they count, but not right
now” (194). Nora’s voice, while not definitive, does place the dialogic process in its histori-
cal and political context, differentiating proximal strategy from ultimate goals — something
Raven, working from her extratemporal perspective, consistently fails to do.
3 I would like to thank Linda Warley of the University of Waterloo for her advice and
encouragement, as well as Jennifer Andrews and the anonymous reviewers at SLC/ÉLC for
their feedback. Work on this paper was supported in part by a Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council doctoral fellowship.
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